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THE CHANGING VIEW OF THE “BYSTANDER” IN HOLOCAUST 
SCHOLARSHIP: HISTORICAL, ETHICAL, AND POLITICAL 
IMPLICATIONS 
 




The role of “bystanders” has been a central theme in discussions 
about the ethical legacy of the Holocaust. In early Holocaust 
historiography, “bystander” was often used as a generalized catchall 
term designating passivity toward Nazi crimes. “Bystander behavior” 
became synonymous with passivity to the plight of others, including the 
failure to speak out against injustice and/or assist its victims. More 
recent scholarship has documented the extent to which local populations 
and institutions were actively complicit in Nazi crimes, participating in 
and benefitting from the persecution of Jewish citizens, not only in 
Germany but across Europe. This newer research has sparked a debate 
about the very use of the term “bystander” and the concomitant 
assumptions about passivity. The historiographical shift has also altered 
ethical interpretations about the role of “bystanders” in a way that has 
broader implications for contemporary discussions about analogous 
situations. Traditionally, ethical behavior has been understood and 
addressed as an individual phenomenon, yet the Holocaust and other 
cases of genocide represent collective forms of violence and 
victimization, raising complex questions about the links between 
individual responsibility and collective behavior. The political and 
ethical implications of the role of “bystanders” remain as complex as 
they were in the immediate wake of the Holocaust. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The bystander question has emerged as a central and provocative theme in 
Holocaust scholarship, one that has found broader resonance in contemporary 
attempts to apply the lessons of the Holocaust to other situations. After May 1945, 
there was international shock and revulsion at the brutal, systematic murders of 
millions of innocent human beings and the equally troubling phenomenon of 
ordinary German citizens who failed to respond as their Jewish neighbors were 
ostracized, persecuted, and ultimately deported to their deaths. This was joined by 
a broader condemnation of the international community’s failure to address 
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effectively the Nazi threat during the 1930s (including the refusal of many 
countries to accept more Jewish refugees) and, after 1939, to stop the full-scale 
genocide of the European Jews.   
From the very beginning, there was an inherent tension in legal, political, and 
academic approaches to the bystander problem. This tension derived from the 
difficulty of understanding (and in legal cases, addressing) a collective 
phenomenon through the lens of ethics and norms that apply to individual 
behavior. The Holocaust (and other instances of genocide and state-sponsored 
persecution of minorities) was a collectively perpetrated crime against a collective 
group of victims, yet norms governing individual behavior and responsibility 
became the dominant framework for addressing the related ethical issues. There 
were logical and pragmatic reasons for this. Human beings act as individuals, even 
when they act on behalf of a greater entity, and the ethical language for 
understanding such behavior is framed in terms of individual motive, action, and 
responsibility. Judicially, even “crimes against humanity” are redressed through 
the prosecution of the responsible individuals. Nations, international bodies, and 
institutions represent and are led by individuals. Despite the emphasis on the 
collective failure of international and institutional bodies during the Holocaust, 
discussions about “bystanders” inevitably turned to the role and responsibilities of 
the individuals involved, whether at a local, international, or corporate level.   
The following sections will offer (1) an overview of the literature; (2) an 
analysis of one case study, the denazification programs in postwar Germany, 
illustrating the complexity of the issues; and (3) an analysis of the limits of 
analogy when the case of bystanders in the Holocaust is compared to other 
situations.   
 
II.  OVERVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
A brief review of how the bystander phenomenon has been examined in 
Holocaust scholarship illustrates how the historiography both illuminated and 
complicated these issues. As historians David Cesarani and Paul Levine have 
observed, in the early scholarship on the Holocaust the term “bystanders” was used 
primarily as a collective designation for the international community and its 
citizens for their failure to stop the genocide.1 Despite historians’ consensus that 
such a failure had occurred, the nature of that failure and the reasons for it were 
contested.2 This was partly due to the very different kinds of “bystanders” under 
examination, ranging from leaders like President Franklin Roosevelt and Pope Pius 
XII, to international banks and corporations, to diplomatic and humanitarian 
circles.3 
																																								 																				
1 DAVID CESARANI & PAUL A. LEVINE, ‘BYSTANDERS’ TO THE HOLOCAUST: A RE-
EVALUATION 8–9 (David Cesarani & Paul A. Levine eds., 2002). 
2 Tony Kushner, ‘Pissing in the Wind’? The Search for Nuance in the Study of 
Holocaust ‘Bystanders,’ in CESARANI & LEVINE, supra note 1, at 57–76. 
3 See MICHAEL R. MARRUS, THE HOLOCAUST IN HISTORY 83 (1987).  
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From the beginning, as Levine noted, discussions of bystanders were 
“characterized more by ambiguity, controversy and charges of political and moral 
failure.”4 Although over the decades a well-documented record emerged with 
respect to the actions of different individuals and groups, their underlying motives 
and the broader circumstantial factors were often less clear—but at the end of the 
day, did motives and historical complexities matter, when millions of people had 
been murdered? The bystander debate has always been as much an ethical matter 
as a historical one, underscored by the view of many Holocaust scholars that the 
Holocaust was not simply a historical event but the unprecedented moral failure of 
Western civilization. The figure of the bystander epitomized this. As the renowned 
Holocaust survivor and scholar Elie Wiesel stated: “What hurts the victim most is 
not the cruelty of the oppressor, but the silence of the bystander.”5 Another 
Holocaust scholar, Yehuda Bauer, put it simply: “thou shalt not be a perpetrator; 
thou shalt not be a victim; and thou shalt never, but never, be a bystander.”6 
The denazification programs created in the aftermath of the 1945 Potsdam 
Agreement were an early attempt to address the guilt and responsibilities of 
German citizens. After the Cold War began, however, the behavior of German 
citizens was understood as having occurred in a totalitarian state in which the 
options for ordinary citizens consisted of either following or disobeying orders. 
Ordinary citizens were not viewed as having much agency or autonomy; at the 
very least, it was assumed that they had made their decisions under the massive 
pressure of a totalitarian state. This view was fostered in particular by two early 
works by scholars who had fled Nazi Germany: Hannah Arendt’s The Origins of 
Totalitarianism (1958) and Theodor Adorno’s The Authoritarian Personality 
(1950).7 In the early 1960s, Yale University psychologist Stanley Milgram built 
upon these perspectives, developing a series of experiments intended to test the 
extent to which people would follow orders they knew to be inhumane.8 
The emphasis in these early works was on understanding the conditions under 
which ordinary people “followed orders,” the underlying assumption being that 
bystanders were people who were otherwise on the sidelines and not directly 
involved in the creation or implementation of Nazi ideology and policy. Their 
fundamental role in history was a passive one. That message was underscored by 
Holocaust survivors’ recollections of neighbors who refused to help or who looked 
away, and by the relatively rare examples of heroic solidarity, rescue, and 
resistance. 
																																								 																				
4 Paul A. Levine, Attitudes and Action: Comparing the Responses of Mid-level 
Bureaucrats to the Holocaust, in CESARANI & LEVINE, supra note 1, at 213.  
5 Elie Wiesel, Forward to Carol Rittner, THE COURAGE TO CARE, at ix–xii (1986).  
6 Yehuda Bauer, On the Holocaust and Its Implications, HOLOCAUST & U.N. 
OUTREACH PROGRAMME, http://www.un.org/en/holocaustremembrance/docs/paper1.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/ERD4-VAFG]. 
7 HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 389–460 (1958); T. W. 
ADORNO ET AL., THE AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALITY 1–19 (Max Horkheimer & Samuel H. 
Flowerman eds., 1950). 
8 STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY: AN EXPERIMENTAL VIEW (1974). 
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As the field of Holocaust scholarship expanded, however, more complex 
narratives emerged about the role of ordinary citizens, institutions, international 
organizations, and governments. Holocaust historiography established that, far 
from being passive, many individuals and groups had played active roles. Raul 
Hilberg’s seminal three-volume work, The Destruction of the European Jews 
(1967), focused on victims and perpetrators, but extensively documented the role 
and complicity of other actors.9 His subsequent book, Perpetrators, Victims, 
Bystanders: The Jewish Catastrophe, 1933–1945 (1992), went into greater detail, 
giving an in depth overview of how people had responded to the persecution of the 
Jews in Nazi Germany and throughout Europe.10 Hilberg summarized the many 
different roles played by bystanders (e.g., banker, neighbor, train conductor, 
mayor, church leader), delineating the options open to different professions and the 
potential significance of their roles. He also categorized them in terms of the 
motives and outcomes of their actions—as helpers, gainers, collaborators, 
onlookers, and witnesses.11 Some bystanders, he noted, may have remained passive 
“onlookers,” but others gained materially, for example, by acquiring property that 
had been owned by Jews.12 It was a reminder that the category of bystander 
encompassed an extraordinarily wide range of actors and behaviors, a point borne 
out by the three volumes on bystanders published in 1989 as part of a nine-volume 
series on the Holocaust edited by historian Michael Marrus.13 The bystanders 
examined in the Marrus anthology ranged from international aid organizations to 
governments to individuals (such as Pope Pius XII and the German theologian and 
resistance figure Dietrich Bonhoeffer) to the populations of occupied countries. 
Historians also began to explore the numerous ways in which bystanders had 
actually participated in Nazi crimes or benefitted from them. In 1996–97, the U.S. 
Senate Banking Committee held hearings on the “Nazi gold” controversy, which 
concerned the activities of Swiss banks that had profited from Nazi crimes.14 In 
some cases, these banks had refused to notify Jewish families about bank accounts 
of relatives who had been murdered; in other cases, the banks made significant 
profits by trading in gold that the Third Reich had plundered from occupied 
nations during the war.15 Occurring fifty years after the Holocaust ended, the 
Senate hearings led to greater public awareness of the complicity of international 
bodies and corporations during the Holocaust. It also raised the profile of 
																																								 																				
9 See generally RAUL HILBERG, THE DESTRUCTION OF THE EUROPEAN JEWS (1967).  
10 See generally RAUL HILBERG, PERPETRATORS, VICTIMS, BYSTANDERS: THE JEWISH 
CATASTROPHE 1933–1945 (1993). 
11 Id. at 212–16. 
12 Id. at 214. 
13 MICHAEL R. MARRUS, 1 THE NAZI HOLOCAUST: HISTORICAL ARTICLES ON THE 
DESTRUCTION OF THE EUROPEAN JEWS (Michael R. Marrus ed., 1989). 
14 CESARANI & LEVINE, supra note 1, at 9–11. 
15 See JONATHAN BOYD & STEPHEN WARD, NAZI GOLD: THE BRITISH AND ALLIED 
ATTEMPT TO DEAL WITH LOOT FROM THE SECOND WORLD WAR AND THE IMPLICATIONS 
FOR THE TRIPARTITE GOLD COMMISSION 5–7, RES. DEP’T HOLOCAUST EDUC. TR. (2d ed. 
1997).  
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organizations, notably The Conference on Jewish Material Claims Against 
Germany, that have promoted the investigation of such crimes and implemented 
legal measures, including restitution.16  
With respect to Germany itself, there is now a significant body of scholarship 
and documentation about the support at all levels of German society for the Nazi 
measures throughout the period of the Third Reich. Robert Gellately’s book The 
Gestapo and German Society: Enforcing Racial Policy, 1933–1945 (1990) and his 
subsequent study Backing Hitler: Consent and Coercion in Nazi Germany (2001) 
documented how the active participation of German citizens enabled the spread 
and power of the Nazi police state.17 A number of studies about the Protestant 
churches in Germany have illustrated the extent to which broad sectors of the 
German Protestant Church supported many aspects of National Socialism, a 
corrective to early works that portrayed the role of the churches more heroically.18 
Peter Fritsche’s Germans into Nazis (1998) explored how Germans from all walks 
of life came to identify, personally and politically, with the Nazi party.19 
Christopher Browning’s seminal book Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 
101 and the Final Solution in Poland (1992) documented the extent to which 
German reserve police officers had participated in Nazi crimes.20 In 1995, the 
Hamburg Institute for Social Research created an exhibition on the role of the 
German Wehrmacht, the armed forces that operated independently from the Nazi 
Waffen SS military units. Wehrmacht veterans claimed to have remained 
uninvolved in German military atrocities, yet the historiography that culminated in 
the 1995 exhibition established the extent to which they too had been involved in 
Nazi crimes.21  
Studies of the behavior of populations in countries under Nazi occupation 
after 1939 have revealed similar, if more complicated, patterns of complicity and 
																																								 																				
16 See MICHAEL J. BAZYLER & ROGER P. ALFORD, HOLOCAUST RESTITUTION: 
PERSPECTIVES ON THE LITIGATION AND ITS LEGACY (MICHAEL J. BAZYLER & ROGER P. 
ALFORD EDS., 2006). 
17 See generally ROBERT GELLATELY, THE GESTAPO AND GERMAN SOCIETY: 
ENFORCING RACIAL POLICY 1933–1945 (1990); ROBERT GELLATELY, BACKING HITLER: 
CONSENT AND COERCION IN NAZI GERMANY (2001).  
18 See, e.g., VICTORIA BARNETT, FOR THE SOUL OF THE PEOPLE: PROTESTANT 
PROTEST AGAINST HITLER (1992); DORIS L. BERGEN, TWISTED CROSS: THE GERMAN 
CHRISTIAN MOVEMENT IN THE THIRD REICH (1996). For an overview of how the 
historiography about the churches changed over the decades, see Robert P. Ericksen, 
Christian Complicity?: Changing Views on German Churches and the Holocaust, U.S. 
HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL MUSEUM (Nov. 8, 2007), https://www.ushmm.org/m/pdfs/Publicat 
ion_OP_2009-11.pdf [https://perma.cc/PY2B-B9Z3]. 
19 See generally PETER FRITSCHE, GERMANS INTO NAZIS (1998). 
20 CHRISTOPHER R. BROWNING, ORDINARY MEN: RESERVE POLICE BATTALION 101 
AND THE FINAL SOLUTION IN POLAND (1992). 
21 For an extensive analysis of this exhibition and the public discussion about it, see 
THE DISCURSIVE CONSTRUCTION OF HISTORY: REMEMBERING THE WEHRMACHT’S WAR OF 
ANNIHILATION (Hannes Heer et al. eds., Steven Fligelston trans., New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan 2008). 
638 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 4 
collaboration.22 Historian Tim Cole, for example, examined the behavior of local 
populations in Hungary during the establishment of town ghettos and subsequent 
deportation for their Jewish neighbors.23 In the case of the village of Nyíregháza, 
Cole discovered that local civilians who owned horse-drawn carts were paid a 
fixed daily rate to transport their Jewish neighbors from the ghetto to the 
deportation trains; he was able to reconstruct the behavior of Nyíregháza citizens 
by examining the invoices that people submitted for payment, through accounts in 
local archives, and from survivor testimony about the behavior of the non-Jewish 
population.24  
This scholarship documents what could be called “active complicity,” 
complicating where scholars draw the line between “bystanders” and 
“perpetrators,” which has led to debate about the very use of the term “bystander,” 
with its connotations of passivity and noninvolvement.25 This in turn has led 
scholars to explore more deeply the processes by which people who began as 
bystanders became more involved as time passed. In a study of the June 1944 
creation of the ghetto in Budapest, for example, Ehrenreich and Cole examined the 
responses of the Jewish community and non-Jewish Hungarian citizens, members 
of the local bureaucracy, and others.26 Ehrenreich and Cole created a triangular 
model illustrating the involvement and interaction between victims, bystanders, 
and perpetrators. The model showed how different responses to the intensified 
anti-Jewish measures could lead a bystander to become either a victim (if the 
bystander became involved in rescue or resistance) or a perpetrator (if the 
bystander became actively involved in persecution and murder).27 In my book 
Bystanders: Conscience and Complicity During the Holocaust (1999), I used a 
complex, multifaceted approach to understanding the issue, first by examining the 
multiple levels (individual, institutional, and international) of “bystander behavior” 
and secondly by emphasizing the factors that shaped the chronological 
development of such behavior (in the case of Nazi Germany, from 1933–1945; in 
																																								 																				
22 There is now an extensive body of research on the behavior of civilian populations 
throughout Nazi occupied Europe. For some of the more striking recent studies of localized 
involvement in Nazi crimes, see JAN T. GROSS, NEIGHBORS: THE DESTRUCTION OF THE 
JEWISH COMMUNITY IN JEDWABNE, POLAND (2001) and TIM COLE, TRACES OF THE 
HOLOCAUST: JOURNEYING IN AND OUT OF THE GHETTOS (2011). 
23 COLE, supra note 22. 
24 See id. at 151. 
25 Several recent conferences have focused on this issue, including a 2008 conference 
sponsored by The Living History Forum in Sweden and a 2016 conference in Amsterdam, 
titled “Probing the Limits of Categorization: The Bystander in Holocaust History.” Probing 
the Limits of Categorization: The Bystander in Holocaust History, LOOKING AT THE 
ONLOOKERS AND BYSTANDERS (Living History Forum, Henrik Edgren ed., 2012).  
26 Robert M. Ehrenreich & Tim Cole, The Perpetrator-Bystander-Victim 
Constellation: Rethinking Genocidal Relationships, 64 HUMAN ORGANIZATION 213, 213–
224 (2005). 
27 Id. at 216. 
2017] THE CHANGING VIEW OF THE “BYSTANDER” 639 
the case of occupied countries, during the wartime period).28 Both studies depicted 
“bystander behavior” during the Holocaust as a fluid process in which there was a 
gradual movement over time either toward complicity or resistance.29 
These historiographical developments have led to an unsatisfying stalemate 
about the most appropriate terminology to describe the patterns of behavior during 
the Holocaust by those who were neither victims nor perpetrators. By definition, a 
“bystander” is one “who is present when an event takes place, but who does not 
become directly involved in it.”30 As noted in my book, that definition could be 
applied in 1933 to a German citizen who by 1935 had become more deeply 
involved in National Socialism in multiple ways—but at that point does one need 
to find another word?31 If the word “bystander” connotes passivity or 
noninvolvement, what other words more accurately apply to the situation of such 
people? Building on Hilberg’s early distinctions, some scholars have suggested 
descriptors of actual action: “onlooker,” for example, or “collaborator.” A recent 
book on Gestapo informers is titled Indirect Perpetrators.32 The more specific the 
descriptor, the clearer the ethical verdict. Nonetheless, even when one is describing 
a specific behavior (such as collaboration with Nazi crimes or gaining financially 
from them), the behaviors and motives involved may be complex. The historical 
reality was that people played different roles over the course of the twelve years of 
the Third Reich. Any discussion of the bystander phenomenon during the 
Holocaust entails a more complicated and multifaceted historical and ethical 
examination of the actions of individuals and groups, one that acknowledges the 
greater autonomy and therefore greater responsibility of many individuals and 
groups previously categorized as “bystanders.” This in turn became the foundation 
of the subsequent ethical and legal attempts to address the problem.  
Although they were developed to uncover perpetrators and collaborators, the 
Allied denazification measures in early postwar Germany can be seen as one such 
attempt, since these measures reached extensively into the sphere of bystanders. 
The challenges that arose during denazification epitomize the complexities that 
later confounded Holocaust scholars as well as those who have tried subsequently 
to address such issues in the wake of cases of genocide and mass violence. 
  
																																								 																				
28 VICTORIA J. BARNETT, BYSTANDERS: CONSCIENCE AND COMPLICITY DURING THE 
HOLOCAUST (1999) 
29 See Victoria J. Barnett, Reflections on the Concept of “Bystander,” in supra note 
25, at 35–52. 
30 Bystander, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (2014).  
31 BARNETT, supra note 28, at 90–94. 
32 ANDREW SZANAJDA, INDIRECT PERPETRATORS: THE PROSECUTION OF INFORMERS 
IN GERMANY, 1945–1965 (2010). 
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III.  DENAZIFICATION IN POSTWAR GERMANY: AN EARLY CASE STUDY  
IN THE COMPLEXITY OF BYSTANDER ISSUES 
 
In the spring of 1945, outraged by what they had found in concentration 
camps, U.S., French, and British troops spontaneously called German citizens to 
account. Local townspeople were ordered to walk through nearby camps past piles 
of corpses, and to cook for camp survivors, clean barracks, and sometimes bury the 
dead.33 U.S. troops collected affidavits from local clergy outside the concentration 
camps to document the burials of the victims in local churchyards.34 In some cases 
troops took matters into their own hands, holding summary trials and executions of 
camp personnel.35 
This atmosphere soon changed, as Allied leaders realized that more 
formalized measures were necessary if there was to be a viable peace and postwar 
democracy in Germany. In the late summer of 1945 Soviet leader Josef Stalin, 
British Prime Minister Clement Attlee,36 and President Harry Truman met in 
Potsdam, Germany, to work out the terms of the defeat of Nazi Germany and set 
the foundation for what was to come.37 They established different zones of 
occupation, under the jurisdiction of the respective military governments. The 
Potsdam Agreement included the intent to demilitarize Germany and reeducate its 
population.38  
The Nuremberg trials of twenty-two Nazi leaders, held in 1945–46, were the 
most visible and significant example of holding Germany internationally 
accountable; it was the first time that perpetrators of “crimes against humanity” 
																																								 																				
33 See MICHAEL BERENBAUM, THE WORLD MUST KNOW: THE HISTORY OF THE 
HOLOCAUST AS TOLD IN THE UNITED STATES HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL MUSEUM 184–92 
(Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 2005) (1993) (noting the material about the reactions of the 
Allied liberation troops to local German civilians). The Museum’s film collections include 
film footage of such interactions between British and U.S. troops and German civilians at 
the camps at Bergen-Belsen, Buchenwald, Dachau, and Nordhausen. See Steven Spielberg 
Film and Video Archive, U.S. HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL MUSEUM, https://www.ushmm.org/ 
online/film/display/detail.php?file_num=200 [https://perma.cc/KAA6-36RH].  
34 The International Tracing Service (ITS) Records contain at least several hundred 
such affidavits in the records of the different camps. The ITS records comprise millions of 
documents, including individual records of people imprisoned in the Nazi camp system, 
that were collected by the International Red Cross after 1945. The U.S. Holocaust 
Memorial Museum has digitized and indexed the collections for research. See International 
Tracing Service Inventory Search, U.S. HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL MUSEUM, 
https://www.ushmm.org/online/its-inventory/simple.php [https://perma.cc/LDA7-V6VU]; 
see also SUZANNE BROWN-FLEMING, NAZI PERSECUTION AND POSTWAR REPERCUSSIONS: 
THE INTERNATIONAL TRACING SERVICE ARCHIVE AND HOLOCAUST RESEARCH (Rowman 
and Littlefield, 2016).  
35 See TOMAZ JARDIM, THE MAUTHAUSEN TRIAL: AMERICAN MILITARY JUSTICE IN 
GERMANY (2012).  
36 Winston Churchill was present for the first weeks of the Potsdam conference.  
37 See CONSTANTINE FITZGIBBON, DENAZIFICATION 75–82 (1969). 
38 Id. at 77–78. 
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were prosecuted by the international community.39 These were followed by the 
1948 United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide and the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights.40 All signaled a 
new international consensus about the seriousness of what had occurred under 
Nazi rule and an affirmation of certain universal standards with respect to the 
rights of minorities. 
This was the background for the denazification programs, an unprecedented 
attempt to delegitimize National Socialism among the German population and 
launch a process of reeducation, primarily by identifying and penalizing local Nazi 
leaders and collaborators.41 The program was interpreted and implemented 
differently in the respective Allied zones. In the Soviet zone the goal was fairly 
straightforward: to weed out civil servants who had been members of the Nazi 
party; by the end of 1945 about two-thirds of these public employees had been 
dismissed.42 In the U.S., British, and French zones, the aim was broader: 
questionnaires were distributed among the adult population to determine not only 
party membership but the degree of involvement (no questionnaires were 
distributed in the Soviet zone).43 All adults in the U.S. zone were required to 
register and fill out a lengthy questionnaire about their activities during the years 
of National Socialism.44 They were then listed under one of five categories, 
ranging from “major offender” (category 1) to “exonerated” (category 5).45 They 
could obtain affidavits from people approved by the Allied authorities (in many 
cases, these were Christian clergy) who absolved them of anything more than 
nominal party membership; the popular term for these certificates was 
Persilscheine, named after a laundry detergent.46 
In the U.S. zone alone, thirteen and a half million adults registered during the 
denazification programs.47 In the U.S., British, and French zones combined there 
were ultimately about 3.6 million denazification proceedings (for individuals who 
fell in categories 1–4).48 Only about 25,000 of these individuals ended up with 
classifications of one or two, and those cases had to be reviewed before tribunals.49 
The sheer numbers of people involved led U.S. authorities to modify the program, 
offering an amnesty for people who obtained Persilscheine.50 In most cases the 
																																								 																				
39 DARREN O’BYRNE, HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INTRODUCTION 91 (2014). 
40 Id. at 85–87.  
41 See FITZGIBBON, supra note 37; Norbert Frei, ADENAUER’S GERMANY AND THE 
NAZI PAST: THE POLITICS OF AMNESTY AND INTEGRATION (Joel Golb trans., Columbia 
Univ. Press 2002). 
42 FITZGIBBON, supra note 37, at 100–101. 
43 Id. at 131. 
44 Id. 
45 Id.; see also FREI, supra note 41, at 32–33. 
46 See BARNETT, supra note 18, at 221–24. 
47 FITZGIBBON, supra note 37, at 131.   
48 FREI, supra note 41, at 38–39. 
49 Id. at 38. 
50 FITZGIBBON, supra note 37, at 140. 
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task of dealing with individuals who fell into categories 2 and 3 was handed over 
to the institutions that employed them, including churches, businesses, universities, 
and some branches of the civil service.51 This meant less clearly defined areas of 
accountability, with fewer consequences for individuals who in fact may have been 
quite actively involved in supporting Nazi policies, as is illustrated by the uneven 
denazification of Roman Catholic and Protestant clergy who had been Nazi party 
members.52 Denazification proved to be bureaucratically unwieldy and widely 
unpopular, provoking a great deal of resentment against Allied authorities.53 
Formal denazification ended in 1951, although it should be noted that there were 
over nine hundred war crimes proceedings in German courts up to the present 
day.54  
Denazification can be considered both a legal and political attempt to address 
many of the questions that subsequently arose about bystander behavior. The fact 
that Allied authorities attempted such an ambitious program indicates that they 
viewed these issues as important. The behavior of ordinary people in Nazi 
Germany, and the widespread support for the Nazi regime that had led so many to 
participate in or benefit from Nazi crimes, clearly had implications for German 
political culture and stability in the wake of Nazism. The stumbling blocks 
encountered by the Allies were the same issues that proved so difficult later for 
Holocaust scholars: Where is the line that differentiates a bystander from a 
perpetrator? Are there degrees of complicity, and once a certain degree has been 
reached, is someone criminally liable? Such questions were the rationale behind 
the five levels of denazification classification, but they could not resolve all the 
questions about motive, intent, and actual involvement. Moreover, such an 
approach inherently affected millions of people, and the uneven success of 
denazification shows the political impossibility of legally addressing complicity on 
a collective level through the prosecution of individuals.  
Even where legal liability seemed straightforward, the social and political 
mechanisms for addressing the ethical and moral aspects were enormously 
complicated. The Nazi regime had implemented a number of policies that were 
fully legal under National Socialism, although they were internationally viewed at 
the time as criminal and declared to be criminal in Germany itself after 1945.55 
Most of the German population acquiesced to such policies and benefitted from 
them (and their legality under Nazism was a defense used after 1945, not just by 
Nazi leaders on trial at Nuremberg, but by local officials, judges, and other 
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professionals caught up in denazification proceedings).56 Allied authorities soon 
realized that they could not put most German citizens on trial or bar them from 
their professions. How, then, could the question of complicity be addressed?  
The German psychiatrist and philosopher Karl Jaspers offered one of the 
earliest attempts to address these questions. An early critic of the Nazi regime 
whose wife was Jewish, Jaspers had lost his teaching position in 1937 and been 
banned from publishing in 1938.57 Assisted by friends, the couple remained in 
Nazi Germany and managed to evade the camps.58  
In 1946 Jaspers published a short book, The Question of German Guilt, which 
was largely an analysis of the debates in Germany about denazification and 
collective guilt.59 Jaspers identified four distinct kinds of guilt: criminal guilt, 
political guilt, moral guilt, and metaphysical guilt.60 Jaspers defined criminal guilt 
as actions that broke established law, political guilt as the “co-responsibility” of 
each citizen for the actions of the state, and moral guilt as the direct individual 
responsibility for one’s own actions, whether taken independently or under order.61 
Metaphysical guilt referred to the spiritual responsibility of each individual for the 
state of the world, a level of guilt in which, as Jaspers put it, “jurisdiction rests 
with God alone.”62   
Each kind of guilt had to be addressed and redressed in a different way, but 
Jaspers argued that of the four, only criminal guilt could be addressed satisfactorily 
in a court of law.63 Denazification could identify criminal and to some extent 
address political guilt, but even on those points it was hampered by the collective 
nature of Nazi crimes. Yet, the underlying rationale for denazification had been to 
address broader issues of political guilt by making citizens acknowledge their 
failed civic responsibilities.64 
Jaspers rejected the notion of collective guilt as impossible and unethical. 
“One cannot make an individual out of a people,” he wrote.65 Yet, the concept of 
political guilt inherently encompassed individual responsibility, because the 
policies of Nazi Germany were grounded “in modes of conduct of the majority of 
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Jaspers’ distinction between collective guilt and collective liability or 
responsibility was also an articulation of the need for political measures that could 
address what had just happened. Denazification was initially conceived as a 
program that would identify mid- and lower-level Nazis, ascertain the extent of 
actual guilt, and prosecute individuals whose criminal guilt could be established.67 
Yet while denazification’s third and fourth categories of involvement did not 
suffice for criminal prosecution, these categories did not establish someone’s lack 
of involvement in what was going on. Denazification triggered an ongoing and 
spirited discussion among postwar German leaders from a number of different 
arenas, including political leaders, church and academic leaders, journalists, and 
public intellectuals.68 That discussion continued in the following decades, turning 
into a process by which German society gradually established a consensus about 
the nation’s history under National Socialism and acknowledged what Jaspers had 
called its “collective liability.”69 What denazification could not accomplish alone 
was eventually brought about by other means, including politically symbolic acts, 
such as German Chancellor Willy Brandt’s kneeling in 1970 before a memorial to 
the victims of the Warsaw ghetto and German president Richard von Weizsäcker’s 
1985 speech “Facing up to Germany’s Past,” on the fortieth anniversary of the 
defeat of Nazi Germany.70  
Denazification was implemented only in postwar Germany, and it was carried 
out more thoroughly and systematically in the western zones than in the Soviet 
zone. While Jewish survivors from other countries certainly gave accounts of their 
betrayal by neighbors, it would be several decades before the patterns of 
complicity and collaboration throughout Europe were well-documented and 
published, and only in more recent historiography have these patterns been 
acknowledged to be a central factor in the persecution of Jews in those countries. If 
anything, the process of addressing the bystander issue in the occupied countries 
was more uneven and contentious than in postwar Germany. The historical realities 
were different, beginning with the fact that these were populations under foreign 
military occupation during the war years who could (and did) argue that they had 
been victims of Nazi violence as well. There are genuine distinctions between the 
circumstances surrounding German citizens in 1933 and those facing Polish 
villagers in 1940 or Hungarian citizens in 1944. At the same time, there were 
collaborationist governments in Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, 
and Vichy France, and movements sympathetic to Nazism in other countries.71 
																																								 																				
67 Id. at 87–94, 140–41. 
68 See ERICKSEN, supra note 51; BARNETT, supra note 18, at 209–39. 
69 JASPERS, supra note 59, at 61. 
70 Richard von Weizsacker, Zum 40. Jahrestag der Beendigung des Krieges in Europa 
und der nationalsozialistischen Gewaltherrschaft: in der Gedenkstunde im Plenarsaal des 
Deutschen Bundestages (May 8, 1985) (Bonn: Bundezentrale für politische Bildung, 1985).  
71 See, e.g., COLE, supra note 22; GERHARD HIRSCHFELD, 
COLLABORATION IN FRANCE: POLITICS AND CULTURE DURING THE NAZI OCCUPATION, 
1940–44 (Gerhard Hirschfeld & Patrick Marsh eds., 1989); DAVID GAUNT, PAUL A. 
2017] THE CHANGING VIEW OF THE “BYSTANDER” 645 
Anti-Semitism was a factor throughout Europe, leading even civilians resentful of 
the Nazis to turn against their Jewish neighbors.   
The history of denazification illustrates the particular complexities of trying 
to address the bystander question in the context of a collective crime like genocide, 
as opposed to the context of individual behavior in more politically stable 
circumstances. In the aftermath of genocide, how does one hold a wide sector of 
individual citizens accountable in a meaningful way, and what does that mean for 
the political and social viability of what follows?  
In Germany, denazification was an early step, but it was followed in the 
ensuing decades by other distinct processes that collectively had the effect of 
establishing a consensus in West Germany about that nation’s obligation to 
remember its Nazi past.72 The process by which the German government and its 
citizens arrived at this consensus was complex, driven by different stages of 
memorialization, ongoing historiography, contemporary events that triggered 
renewed debate about the past (such as the 1985 Bitburg controversy), and 
commemorations of major anniversaries.73  
 
IV.  UNDERSTANDING THE ROLE OF BYSTANDERS IN OTHER CONTEXTS:  
THE LIMITS OF ANALOGY 
 
Understanding the role of “bystanders” during the Holocaust entails dealing 
with multiple levels of historical complexity. Yet, as noted at the beginning of this 
article, the bystander issue in the Holocaust resonates precisely because it speaks 
to a set of ethical issues that are quite relevant in other contexts: (1) the decisions 
that individuals make about how to respond to what happens around them; (2) the 
vulnerability of victims and their dependence upon outside individuals or groups to 
protect and assist them; (3) the need for measures, legal or otherwise, that can 
address the issue of complicity and the failure to protect victims; and (4) the 
implications of “bystander behavior” for society and political culture. “The 
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support, opposition, or indifference” of bystanders, notes social psychologist Ervin 
Staub, “largely shapes the course of events.”74 
To what extent can the insights about the multifaceted role of “bystanders” 
during the Holocaust be applied to other instances, ranging from contemporary 
cases of mass violence to problems of school bullying and campus rape? Some 
scholarship on the role of bystanders in the Holocaust has identified where possible 
analogies lie, notably works that focus on the dynamics of basic human behavior, 
psychology, and social behavior.75 Much of the historiography illustrates the extent 
to which individual complicity in Nazi crimes was driven by mundane motives like 
greed, opportunism, and conformity—motives that may influence “bystanders” in 
other situations.76  
Some caution must be taken with analogies. More examination is needed of 
the relationship between these basic human behaviors and their political context 
during the Holocaust, particularly with respect to the influence of mass ideology, 
anti-Semitism, and nationalism on the ethical choices of individual citizens and on 
social institutions, like the churches, that had the potential to offer platforms for 
resistance but failed to do so. The Holocaust was an extraordinary situation: a 
totalitarian state based upon a racialized ideology that sought to eradicate the 
Jewish population from Europe. Nazi ideology created a new system of ethics and 
norms, overturning and reversing previous ethical norms about the responsibilities 
of individual citizens. There was a “Nazi ethic” to which most German citizens 
conformed; in that context, “bystanders” became complicit through their very 
presence in the system.77  
Even in cases (such as the desire for approval from one’s peers or 
supervisors) where the human motives during the Holocaust appear similar to 
motives today in cases in which the bystander question arises, there is a contextual 
(and historians would argue a legal) difference between the options faced by 
citizens in Nazi Germany and those, for example, in the contemporary United 
States. After 1933, when anti-Jewish measures and other new laws were 
implemented in Nazi Germany, citizens were expected to obey them and inform on 
people who circumvented the law. “Bystanders” in such situations might await 
repercussions for resisting the law. In contrast, the role of bystanders in the United 
States in instances of rape or bullying, while they might suffer consequences from 
those committing these acts, are trying to prevent actions categorized in this 
society as criminal (in the case of rape and some cases of bullying) behavior. 
Analogies with respect to the dynamics between individual behavior, and how 
it affects and is judged by political culture, may be more productive. Despite the 
distinctions between totalitarian and nontotalitarian settings, the historiography on 
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the Holocaust has raised awareness about the autonomy and power of individual 
citizens as a significant factor in what happened under National Socialism. The 
aforementioned works by Browning, Ericksen, and Gellately show the extent to 
which individuals actively chose to become involved in the Nazi project. Jaspers 
recognized this in 1946 when he wrote of the “collective liability” of the German 
population for what the Nazi regime had done.78  
This historical clarity about the complicity of bystanders has led to greater 
ethical clarity, which has been a crucial factor for the post-Holocaust political 
culture of Germany and other nations where the Holocaust occurred. As Barnett 
writes, “in the decades since the Holocaust, ethical reflection and historiography 
have gone hand in hand. . . . History, done well, helps to keep us ethically honest 
by keeping the truth of the record out there.”79 In Germany, this has been 
exemplified more effectively through political measures, sometimes symbolic 
ones, than through legal measures.80 Discussions about memorialization can trigger 
national conversations that address the ethical issues of the past, leading to ways to 
incorporate new historical understandings into the political and social culture. This 
may signal a path beyond the impasse in some academic discussions about the 
contemporary relevance of “bystander” behavior. If approached as a legal matter, 
the complexities and distinctions between different situations may prove 
insurmountable. If addressing the role of bystanders and related issues of 
complicity is understood as an important element in shaping political culture and 
concomitant notions of citizen responsibility, however, individual citizens may 
develop a more proactive stance with respect to the fates of those around them and 
a greater sense of responsibility for the course of their society as a whole.  
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